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CHAPTER I

REVIVAL OF INTEREST IN TELEOLOGY
The philosopher has always ....c~aimed
inquiry into
..,
the ultimate causes as bis peculiar field. He observes
phenomena with a view to their interpretation.
the eternal ttWhy?u of things.

For

a.

He asks

time he may l)e con-

tent with knowing how the objects of his observation

o~-

erate, or simply that they operate, but he 'flill not be
satisfied till he knows thi\11.y?1t

This wonder, this cur-

iosity to know the reasons for things, and the

ab~lity

to answer his own inquiries is one of mants most prominent characteristics.
For nearly three centuries men have been amazed
at the wonders of science and dLscovery, and enthralled
with the pleasures they afforded.

They have delighted

in their inventions as children around their Christmas
I

tree, flitting from one toy to another, content to know
that everything worked and that all was theirs.

A few

ca tch words, evolution, "it just unrolled u ; atomism, tti 13
is made up of

p~,rtslt;

mechanism, "it works";

furnished

all the explanation to which most people had time to
listen.

There were other toys to be examined.
During more than two hundred years after Descartes

6
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it was the fashion in non-scholastic circles to overlook
or to sneer at any hint of intrinsic purpose in the world.
Spinoza

~~d

Leibnitz continually opposed the notion of

intrinsic finality in the

universe~.

and Hume, denying

all causali ty, ''fished especially to stamp out all Sllperstitions favoring final cause.

The order which had come

into the "chaos of the poets" was su~posed siI:1ply to have
evolved, lmrolled, according to the laws of nature.
Ih,Vhe:'ce those laws?"

Tha t was an unfair question.

.tFor what purpose was the evolution?"

But
And

Only the Dark Age

II':an could have proposed such a query.
l'iIinds alert to current thought, however, perceive
that the curiosity of the world is being gorged with
novelties and facts.
sta~ding.

Men are beginning to seek nnder-

True to their human nature they are becoming

philosophers and asking, ttWhat does it all mean?"
does it lead?"

"Whither

The answer to these questions leads the
I

inquirer into the subject of final causes.
Since late in the
had new

defe~ders

nineteen~h

century finality has

11'1. many fields of lmowledge.

Dilthey"s

psychology of history, Stern's "personalism," Driesch's
vitalism, and Wertheimer's nGe~alt" psychology are all
approaches to final i ty.

Many French phi"losophers, notably

Jouffroy, Janet, Renouvier, Boutroux, and Ravaisson have

7

sincerely championed teleology, though not always

in~

the scholastic sense of the te:rn1, and have done much
in

l~ance

mechanism.

to overshadow the uXlcJeserved po:r:mlari ty of
Eenderson' s t"\'Vo books,

~~_t!':.~_~_~

.~}~e_ ~nvi~

of

onment and Order of l:atll..re caused 1o::drne stir in this
country -([hen first publlshed.

Llo'yd .l,iorgcn' s tbeory

,.

of Emergent Evolution describes a development from matter
through the lower forms of life to the suprene goal
which is mind.

Professor Greenywod' s

ogy and Ohristial1

~~:.~}:ief,

rece~lt

book, Biol-

also favors a ))u..rposi ve outlook.

;:.ioreover, the philosophy of value, at bottom a

In~oblem

of finality, has in recent years become slJ..rprj.sinsly
popular.
This nevI trend in sclence 8nd philoso})hy lends
r.1ore than usual propriety to discussions o! the scho1asti.c doctrine of final causes.

I
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.'

II

THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF PIl~AL CAFS:;};S

St. Thomas has written much and well on the subject
of final causes.

!Ie gives brief, £-w-sp proofs for the ob-

,iectivity of final causes and the principle of finality.
Yet, he and his contemporaries were more inclined than
men of our more sceptical age to tak~ the existence of
final causes for granted, and to insist chiefly on the
teaching of reason and revelation regarding the greatest
of all final ca"Llses, the final ca"\)se of man.

Our mod-

ern mechanistic school, however, has grown up outside the
scholastic traditions, and has failed to appreciate the
value of its centuries' store of speculation.

As a re-

sult students under mechanistic tutelage have been occupied with more fU:'ldamental problems of teleology, doubting ,..
even whether final causes really exist.
intention of

tr~s

rrhe principal

paper \rlll be to point out the pro-

priety of the doctrine of scholastic philosophy on final
Ca1.1SeS as an explanation of the order of nature and of
the de teruine d charac ter of ns. tllrRl phenomena.

For sake

of clarity, however, we shall begin with a few more general notions.
Final cause is usually defined as ttthat for the
sake of which something is done. n 1

In general, final

I

9

or purposive activity means action with an end in view;

•

making use, therefore, of apt means to attain an end;

Psy-

acting from a motive with purpose, design, or plan.
chologically the
perience.
'i"lOr1C

~otion

of end arises from our own ex-

We take medicine in ord~r-to be healed; we

to make, a living;

country's liberty.

we fight a war to preserve our

A hundred times a day we go somewhere,

•

or do something in order to obtain or accomplish some
desired end.
act.

These ends are the motives from which we

Our free will allows us to cho.ose our motiires, to

accentuate one or other of many possible motives.
motive or end is always some
2

re8.l or apparent.

apprehe~1ded

This

good either

It must be a good because we never

place an action with the intention

th~t

it will redound

to our own complete disadvantage.

It must be apprehended

because it is impossible to strive for, or even to desire
a good of which we are

entirel~v

ignorant.

The reco€Di tion,

therefore, of an oo,ject or an action as advantageous or
desirable to ourselves is an absolutely necessary condition for it to operate as a cause determining our
delibera te acts.
But while recognition of the end is a condition,
the end itself is more than a condition.
ditions must be clearly distinguished.

Causes and conA condition is

sometimes called in scholastic terminology a

r~ns

I
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.P!.().11.~.!J.E3.~~..

Wi thin the defini ti on of condition come a1'1

thJ.ngs that consist in the removal of obstacles that would
prevent an action from taldng place, or in the posi tina;
of circumstances which would facilitate it.

A cause, on

the other hand, actually assists it~ringing something
into being, or in effecting some change, which, of itself,
assuming even that all necessary

CO~~itions

were present,

could not have come about.
An illustration will show plainly the difference
between the two notions.

Gravity is the cause of water

running through a canal.

But a necessary condition is

that the locks be open.

Without gravi ty as a cs.use,

the mere lifting of the gates, the condition, could never
effect the flow of water.

Applying the comparison to

motivated action, a little reflection will reveal to us
that the end of our striving is more than a condition.
It drives us to action.

The ambition to become a doctor

mal{es a young man go through years of gruelling study,
almost ruining his own health in order to be able to save
that of others.

An end, therefore, at least in human

affairs, is a cause, not the only cause, but a cause
nevertheless, which incites men to do that which without
the end they would not and could not do.
Thus, it is quite obvious that persons, when they

I
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act deliberately, do so because of some definite end
they have in mind.

~

The real problem of teleology, how-

ever, is usually consldered to -:.;e tbe question whetber
non-intellectual nature is influenced by final causes •

.

Schole.stic philosophers have alwayii' ~ld that fine.l causes
are operative here also.

St. Thomas writes:

It r:lUS t be observed that a thi.g tends to an end,
by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a
thing moving itself to the end,--as man; secondly,
as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow
tends to a determinate end through being moved by the
archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore
those things that are possessed of reason, ::nove themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their
ac tions, tb.-roueh their free will 'which is the faculty
of will and reason. But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being
moved by another and not by themselves; since tbey
do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain a~ything to an end, but can be
ordai. ned to an end by another. For the en tire irrational nature is in comparison to God as ~~ instrument to the principal agent •••• Consequently it is
.....
proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end,
as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are
altogether void of knowledge. 3
I

The phrase to be insisted on here, as is clear
from other related passages,. is that irra.tional beings,
animals, trees, etc., tend to their ends by natural
inclination.

The idea is not that they are moved only

by an extrinsic cause as a pebble by the foot, but t}:11'.l. t
the extrinsic cause, their Creator, has impressed His
4

own purpose upon natural bodies, so that in tending

12
accordi~g

to their natures to their own ends, they al:?

act instrumentall:; according to the Creator's intention.
A word about the way in which the final cause
operates will help to a better understanding of its nature •

.....

Final influence can be best studied in tr.ose beings where
it is most evident, namely in intellectual beings.

We

have seen t!.1at final cause is no mere. condi tion, but a
true cal1se.

Its influence, however, must be distinguish-

ed from that of efficient ca1Jse.

Efficient causes pro-

duce their effects by physical action as when a horse
pulls a wagon.

The finru cause produces its rosults

on the actions of persons Simply by being an attractive
object which, however, must be apprehended and desired
as a good.

ItJust as the efficient cause has its influ-

ence by acting, so the final cause has its influence
5

by being desired and sought after."

Bfficient cause

actually exists when it is a cause.

Final cause

q~B:

cause does not yet exist except in the consciousness
of the one desiring it.
actual, but possible.

It is an oojecti ve reali ty, not
As soon as it becomes actual it is

no longer a cause, but an effect.

Hence the distinction'
6

between the end intended and the end attained.
the end intended

~lich

It is only

acts causally.

The chief influence of final cause consists in

I
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initiating and directing the operation of the aeent or
efficient cause.

The end is the cause of the efficient cause, not,
however, in so far as it is a being, but in as much
as it is a cause. For the efficient cause is such
in so far as it acts; but i t do~i. not act except
for the sake of the end. 7
The fact that the efficient cause always produces
a determined effect is also due to fita1 cause.
'\liere an 8.,'!,ent not to act for a definite effect,
all effects w01}ld be indifferent to it. Now that
which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another:. wherefore from that
which is indifferent to either of two effects, no
effect results, unless it be determined by something
to one of them. Rence it would be impossible for
it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end. 8
Thus, the fact that an effect is produced j.s due
to the efficient cause.

The fa.ct that a determined

effect is produced is due to the final cause.

Since

the intention is prior to the action, final cause is
9

I

said to be the first of all the causes.
All we have thus far said on the operation of
final cause was largely from the metaphysical point of view.
It may also be viewed psychologically.

The influence

of the final cause on the ap peti te, as VIe have noted
above, results from the mere presence of the idea of the
end in the mind as good or beneficial to the one to whom

15

by God we do not wish to imply that we call upon the pature of God to prove the existence of final causes in the
world.

Rather the opposite.

be proved from final causes.

The existence of God can
If we should attempt to

.

prove the existence of final ca.use] --rrom the

:na ture

of

God, we should apparently be arguing in a circle, though we
should not necessarily do so.

We

mi~ht

first establish

the existence of God from other arguments.

After that

we could infer from God's rational nature that no object
of His creative power would be purposeless.

Perhaps

this would be the only way to prove that there 'l'as no
instance of di sorder in the world; that all evil serves
some purpose either :oroximate or remote.

To assert that

disorder is impossible, however, is not necessary to bur
present thesis.
final causes in

Suffice it to prove that there are some
irr~tional

nature.

Hence, the argument we propose to the mechanists
is not:

God is an intelligent Creator of the nniverse;

but an intelligent Creator would not create except for
a. purpose; therefore, there is purpose, design, finality
in the universe.

Our argument is rather: there is an

order manifest in the world; but there can be no order,
plan, or deSign, without final causes; therefore, there
are final causes in the universe (subject ultimately,
of course, to a directive supra-mundane Intelligence).

I

16
It may have already been noted that the

exist~ce

of a Sl1preme Intellige"ce is assumed in this paper.

It

is, indeed, rather assumed than proved, although the fact
of final causes cannot but imply It.

When archaeologists

discover bits of pottery,

bone instrmnents,

weapons?~r

they always attribute them to beings with intellects,
not to monkeys, or much less to chance atomic formations •
~!Ihy

•

are rot mechani ats as logical when they find the

more marvelous productions of

natu~e?

the fear of theism as a logical

It is probably

con~lusion

rather than

any intrinsic difficulty in the concept of final causes
tha.t has led evolutionists and mecha'1ists to deny them.
01.1!' contention is, however, that we can esta.blish
the existence of final causes before we establish the
Intelligence.

In other words, as the minor of the above

argument states, order and design necessarily imply purpose or finality.

The proof of this proposition will

be developed in the course of the paper.
ly stated.

Here it is mere-

The argument is based partly on a perfect

analogy between the actions of intelligent and non-intelligent natures, but especially on the fact that, denying
finality, there is
order.

~o

intelligent explanation of nature's

All will admit that irrational natures acting

according to definite laws attain to a perfection that
is suitable to them.

This fact calls for an explanation.

I

1'7

The mechanistic attitude is agnostic.

The

scholasti~.

philosophy does offer an intelligible if not comprehensive eXDlanation of order and regulari ty in nat1.U'e by
recognizing in each individual nature an intrinsic nrin-

.

c iple of developMent and perfec tj.dh ......lhich ultimately
is considered to have been implal1ted there by the Wisdom
and Power of its Creator.
Before closing the general discussion of final
causes mention should be made of two divisions which
are frequently referred to in treatises on finality in
na ture.
and

f~n~s

The older scholastics called them

.f~~2:.~

gp_eris

operantis. We shall follow an equally comrnon

usae:e by calling them intrinsic and extrinsic final causes.
The intrir'sic final causes or ends of natural bodies are
those which are adapted. to their own good and perfection.

,...

Extrinsic ends are those which serve rather the good
of some other part of the universe.

Intrinsic ends of

a fruit tree, for example, would be growth, fruition,
and propagation.
food for rrnn.

An extrinsic end would be to furnish

To these divisions will corresDond ab-

solute and relative order which will be spoken of in the
next chapter.

I
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The end, 1. e. that for the 3e.]~e of which a thing
is; e.s. heal th is the cause of ':ml}<;:inr,. For '";'Ihy
does o:.ce VI8.l'c?'
we say;
'that one Y!lay be healthy';
and in spe'-1.~dng thus we think we he. 'ie r~i ven the cal;.se.
Aristotle, ketaphysica, W.D..·1:~oss, editor (Oxford:
the Clarendon Pr0·s's,· T~;T28T, lib~ Delta, 2, 1013 a 33.
No':v tba t to which an ap;en t tonds def::ll1 tely must
needs be befittin~ to that 8.;ent: since the latter
Vlould,,-ot te:1cl to it save on acc<iuJ.'1t of some fi ttin:>;ne ss
thereto. 3ut trJa t vlhj.ch is befi 'f;tin~: to a t>'ing
is good for it. Therefore ever;T agent ac ts for a good.
st. Tho:mas, The ,cherma Contra Gentiles, tr. by t:je
Fathers of t:'J.e Enro,lish IJOniTiii"c-a-ri ?~rovi::1c-e-··-rt"ondon~ Burns,
Oates, and ~4:o.3hbourne Ltd., 1928), Bk. III, ch. 3.
St. Thomas, rrhe U Summa Theologica It, tr. by the
Fathers of the En;:;lish :oom:cn.{c·an -ProVr-rlce (2nd edj. tion;
London: Burns, Oates, and 'Nashbourne Ltd., 1927), I-II,
q. 1, a. 2.

4.
The tern: ;1a tural body is used in tbis paper in
contradistinct:i.on to implements or machinery, for this
class of oi):iects ·oears tne stamp of man's intelli;"ence,
and they are obvL:;usly made a'ld onera ted for a 'JUT'POS e.
"Sicut auteTn. influere causae efficientis est agere,
influere causae finalis est appetl et desiderari. u
St. Thomas, De Veri~ate (vbl. 9, Onera Omnia,
Parmae: Tyois Petrl-PlaccadorI, 1859), 11-=--~;r2,- a~--2-;
how an e0d is possessed in two ways;
perfectly
and imperfectly. Perfectly, . . .lnen it is possessed
not only in intention but slso in reality;
imperfectly, when it is posoessed in intention only.
St. 'J:'homa8, The ttSUJil1ilO.. Theolo;>:ica u , tr. by the I,'athera of tl:e EnFllsh Dominican-Pr-ovirice--r2nd edi tion;
London: burns, Oa te s, and Washbo'l1I'ne Ltd., 1927), I-II;
q. 11, a. 4 •
. .,.
St. Thor;:ns, .~Y..l: ~iet:~p.)~, (vol. 20, .o.E.~.r_11. Omnia,
Parmae: Typi8 Petri :?ia c-Fadori, 1866) lib. V, le6":··-2.
St. 'rl".omas, The ,Summa Contra Gentiles, tr. by
English Dominican Fatheirs· TLon-aon":-131frn-s, Oates, and
hbourne Ltd., 1928), Bk. III, ch, 2.

I
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The end holds the highest -,,12_ce amonr; the Ca-tlS~S,
and it i,- from it that all other causes derive t:heir
actual causality;
since the agent acts ~ot except
for the end ••• and it is due to the a;:~ent that the
'o~a tter is brought to the actuali t:'J of the form:
wherefore the r;:a tter is made BC tl.lally the rna tter,
B.nd t"be form is mode the form, of this particular
thinr~, throu9'h the agent IS acti@n, and consequently tbr01..l(~h the end. The later end also, ls tLe C9.11Se
of th~ precedin~ end being intended as an end: for
a thinp is not moved towards a proximate end, except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the
last end is the first cause of a~l.
I~~d., ch. 17.

I
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CHAPTER I I I

."

TEE ORDER OF :lJkJ:URE

Before considering the fact of the order from which
we shall argue to the existence of;. 'tinal causes in ne. ture
it will be helpful to enucleate the concept of order.
According to scholastic authors three things are requir-

i~ things to be or-

ed to fulfil the notion of order:
dered;

2) certain relations of position or succession;
1

3) a principle of order.

Moreover, in all order two

things are implied: 1) an intelligent orderer, and 2)
a reason for ordering.

If we take the exampJe of an army,

the soldiers are the objects to be ordered; their division into companies or battalions would estabJish the
rela tions of position or succes sion; the prinCiple of the
division or order might be the number of years of experience, the nationality, or the type of arti1Jery which
the various groups are accus tomed to operate.

The or-

derer implied is the general, and the purpose will depend upon his intentions.
hope of victory.

We

I1'1fl.y

presume that it is the

Order, therefore,

~ay

be defined as

an exact arrangment of things in their proper positions
Or rela tions according to the requirements of the end
2
in view.
To distinguish between the ordered systems set

I
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up by mtn and the order of na ture the former is calle.d
artificial order while the latter is styled

natu~al.

From the scholastic teleologist's point of view the only difference between artificial and natural' order is
in the principle.

In artificial a'riter the principle

is extrinsic to the objects ordered;
jects are indifferent to the norm.

that is, the ob-

.,In the above example

the soldiers are equally capable of being eli v~_(ted according to anyone of the three norms.
ciple is intrinsic.

In nature the prin-

It is stable and unchanging.

This

notion of stability, however, is not meant to exclude the
possibility of 310w evolutionary development.

It meaYJ.8

merely that at any Given time natural arsents act in a
determined manner ar:.d according to laws, which, if they
are knqv./n, permit predict£lbili ty of effects wi thin a
c'lose margin of accuracy.
To the :r:lechanist, however, the two ulterior implications of order, namely, the oI'derer and a purpose in
the sense of a final cause, are superfluous when there is
question of natural order.

He concelves nat'ure as a sys-

tern of bodies endowed with certain forces which under
given conditions cannot help producing their effects.
He Gn.mi ts effieient causes, and thinks therein is had
the full explanation of the activities of nature.

The

scholastic teleologist also recofnizes the forces of

I
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no. ture, but he sees still more.

He sees a tend_ency

in

the forms of natl~e towards a ~erfective goal for which,
try as he may, he ca~not account b:r indiscriminate forces.
He is convinced tha t the various nat1..U'al bodies are pos-

sessed of an intri"sic principle ];ihdi"g them wi thout
fail, unless there is some external interfererJ_ce, to a
fixed ter~::inus.

He may go so far as to define the na-

•

ture of a natural body as the subst~Llce or essecce of
that body in so far as it is subject to an interior
3

principle of finality.

Adequately considered this inter-

nal principle represents an impulse impressed by a Supreme
Will upon each beinr; by which it tends in a more or less
regular a:ld. predj_ctable Benner towards a certain fullness
or rrn turi ty which may be considered its o\'m perfection.
In order to bring out the idea of the intrinsic
principle of order in nature, scholastics distir1p;uish
between absolute and relative order.

Relative order is

that which exists between the various objects of nature.
Absolute order is that which is e~tirely within a given
body regardless of its relations to other bodies.

Every

mineral, plant, and 9_nimal furnishes o.n ezample of absolute order.

Abu'ldant ill1-ls tra tions of each v;1ll be gi v-

en ,:)resently.
The fact of nature's order

DO

one can deny.

I
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Nietzche and Schopenhauer may eX8.ggerate the defects of
order;

Diderot or Buechner may say that it is due to chance;

Kant and his disciples may contend that it is a purely
Dental projection;
'='here

~_s

but Qot

o~e

of

the~

can deny the fact.

not a single science' that;;, tl,oes not bear wltness

to the order of the universe.
The most

cler~raded

of savages ,.i\Otiee the rec;ularity

of the rislng SUI1, and the reCUrre!.lce of the yearly seasons.

Our mos t accurate time is detcrmi,1ed lJ:;r the

~re-

cision of the revoh:tions of the stars as observed by
the astronomer's transit.

The same law of gravity that

holds the stars to their pOSitions or orbits
'lens binds our planet to the sun,

D.!'HI

i~

thB hea-

prevents us from

being catapulted into space as we speed alons at a rate
higher than any modern projectile.

The atmosphere that

blankets the earth prevents the sun's rays frol':J. conSUll1ing us by day

a~ld

the heat from escaping at ni&lJ.t.

By

means of their chlorophyl ae tion plants 'use up the carbon
dioxide exhaled by animals, and release oxygen Bpain into
the air thus preserving always the bala])ce of p;ases Ylecessary for tr.eir mutual benefit.

"fa ter is evaporated from

the ocean by the sun, carried by the wind over the land,
and dropped in the form of rain to f 1)rnish drink for
animals and

I~oist1..1.re

for plants.

Tbe surplus is c 01-

lected into rivers and carried back to the sea arain,

I
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in the meantime furnishing a means of transportation ••'
~itrosen,

in

~reat

a necessity for fertile soil, is precipitated
quantities from the air

into ths 2round by tbe rain.

li~htninG

and soaked

It is also gathered in

.

surplus q_; anti ties on the roots or~overs and other
legumincus plants for the use of other crops that need
it.

l.'la.'1Y

.

flowers depend upon bees and otrer insects for

pollination.

The saying that one man's food is another man's
poison holds good in

Almost every creature in

nat~~e.

nature seems to be both a help and a hindrance to some
other creature.

The result is a relative equilibrium.

Tb.is might be a hard thesis to
trated by the

bala-~ced

eat the smaller ones.

~rove,

aquarium.

but may be illus-

Eere the larger fish

These in turn eat crayfish and

larger insects, while ir.sects eat the protozoa.

~

The pro-

tozoa feed upon the green plants, and the latter live
by the refuse of the higher animals.

Thus the whole of

nature seems to be linked together.

Animals, plants, and

minerals are mntually serviceable.

Every par t of the world

seems to fit in harmoniously with every other part.
The above examples are largely illFstrative of
extrinsic or relative order.

Evidence of puxpose is

still more striking in the intrinsic construction, ar-

I
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rangment, and activities of' individual organisms, /?,n<!'
even in inorganic bodies such as crystals, molecules, and
atoms.
Think of' the innumerable

v~~ety

of organs and parts

tba t com')ose the human body; their diverse activities
and tb.eir marvelous combination into one uylified indi vid-

•

ual; their cooperation to preserve and perfect that individual.

rrhe body's architectural

com~lexity,

its ease

of function, and esthetic coordination .are ilYllneasurably
more perf'ect than anything man has ever invented.
The hurlan eye is an ins truT:len t so delicately ad,lusted to tbe f'unction of vision that at least a dozen
conditions must be fulfilled befol'e it can see, and, yet,
compara ti vely s?J8aking, how few are blindl

First a brain

is presupposed, and there must be nerves running between
tbe brain and the eye which are a:Jle to bear the i:r.1pression
of lir;ht.

These nerves terminate in a very special Bnd

impressio;naole tissue called the retina.

Various auto-

matic contractions must regulate the focus according to
the distance of the object.

I

.

'1'he qua'1.tity of liC;ht allowed

to enter the e:re is regulaterl by cO;'ltractions of the
iris.

The roels and cones at the nerve ends transform

the light waves of different lengths into color sensations.
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only two

The fact that there are two eyes fives the stereoscopic
~

effect of three dimensions.
dimensi ons.

1; erve

One eye can see

coordinations a"c1 numerous tiny muscle s

enable the two eyes to turn together hither and thither
and to act ''lormally as one organ.

;;r'~

distinct'-Jess and

exact sh:1ilari ty of the imac;es on the two retinas presents
the appearalce of one picture.

Tear's r.la}re the cornea

l;:ore transparent a'.ld renove from it tll dust particle s.
The sunken posi tion of the eye in the forehead ins1.1res
4

its protection.

And all this lay hidden in the produc-

tive ?ower of the primitive cell%
Too much space would be required to

eo

into such

detail wi th all the organs, but a few remarks about some
of the mOre important ones will be in place.

How perfect-

ly the stomach and alimentary system is fitted for digestion.

The stomach with its juices can dissolve foods and

meats of

~l

never attack
~~o

kinds, but the acids, with rare exceptions,
t~e

stomach itselfl

one on examining a pump would deny that it was

made by an intelligent person for the purpose of pumping,
Yet the heart, pushing blood to all parts of the body,
and to those parts e:s)eclally where at a r;:tven time it is
most needed to feed the body, repair tired muscle, or rewove waste, or, finally to be purified in the lungs is a

I
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to the very bed 'from which they were hatched to lay their
~

6

et'siY,S an d die.
Adult eels of the fresh water strear'1S of the 3[11tic lea 'fe tbe:1.r home in the autlJ1'1n, . pns s inz Denmark and
;;'..;,

England, then turning southwards cross the

Atla~tic.

They spawn in the depths of the ocean sonthwest of Bermuda,
then, like the

sal~Ilon,

die.

The nexi s;)rinr-; the :roung

eels return across the ocean to their fresh water streams
where they live for four or fivEt years before repeating
7

the habits of their ancestors.
Some of the niore extraordinary instincts are possessed by ants an.r'l honey bees.

Shakespeare, rolding the lat-

tor up to man as an

of obedie':1ce and cooperation,

eXffil1 ple

poetically summarizes most of their a'uili ties:
Creatures that by a rule in nature teach
The act of order to a peopled kinGdom.
They have a king and officers of sorts;
Where some, like. magistrates, correct at home,
Others, like merchants, venture trade abroad,
Others, like soldiers, armed in their stings,
1,Iake boot upon the surmner's velvet buds,
Which pillage they with merry ~arch bring home
To the tent royal of their emperor:
Who busied in his majes ty, sv.rveys
Ths singin~ masons building roofs of gold,
The civil citizens kneading up the honey,
The poor mechanic porters crowding in
Their reavy bUI'dens at his narrow gate,
The sad-eyed justice, wi th bis surly hum,
Deliverinp o'er to executors pale
The lazy yawning drone. 8
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Similar to the instincts of animals are the tr4'lpisms
of plants.

The roots of a tree will always grow towards

the moisture, so that if the water is on only one side
of the tree necrly all the roots will be on that side.
Their leanin[; towards the light iSi> Well vnorm.

These

are two of the :.-::any tendencies in plants to grow towards
that which will prove most beneficial to them •

•

Many of the instincts of animals are c01?1plemented
with mechanisms for protection against their enemies,
and for the acqui.sition of food.
has a natural enemy.

l'1early every animal

':'fhet'.'er it be another animal or

plant, or variatio21.s, ordinary or extraordinary, of climate
or other life conditions they generally have some method
of defet:.se or preservation which enables them to withstand
tt,eir peculiar

o~)posi

tion.

It wou1d be tedious to mention ,...

more than the mere classes of defense mechanisms.

Some

animals, e of::.• , frogs, waE=ing sticks, and katydids are
protected by the fact that they are indistinguishable from
the leaves and green plants which form tIwir usual habi ta ts.
The chameleon, certain fishes, Q':1.d ether anllnals are
able eve:::1 to c[-Iange their color to ma tch their surrourldings.
glands;

.30me defend themselves wi tb stings, and poisonous
others such as the octupus ano cuttlefish by ink-

throwing glands.

Crayfish, crocodiles, turtles, molluscs,

sea urChins, caddis flies, and porcupines have a pro-

I
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tee ti ve arn:or.
Equally diversified as the defense adaptations
are those which are a help to obtain food.
such as owls generally ha'Je large
often rely upon swiftness.

ey~s,

Night feeders

while day feeders

The chameleon with its quick

tongue can capture unwary insects at a d:i.stance of seven

•

inches from its body.

Professor 'J'V'oodruff ab,ost panegyrizes the wonderful utility and apti tnde of the worker bee's leGs to the
needs of the bee.

The

~lotation

is a little long, but

the numerous details could hardly be summarized more
briefly.

It should be remembered tbat this is only one

example out of thousands which could be cited to illustra te h.armony between living things and their environment.
It seems that it sh0uld at least l)rovoke tbe question
whether some third factor did not

fore~ee

sEd perhaps

assist in the mutual fi tting of the environment wi th the
objects within it.
The worker is a 'bundle of adaptations' for its
varied duties. Indeed, when we tal'e away the adapta-.
tions there is little left! The primitive insect appendages have become specialized in the worker 3ee,
so that collectively they constitute l? batter;l of
tools adapted with great ntcety to the uses for which
they are employed. This applies to all of the appendages of the insect's body, but ~e shall neglect t~ose
of the bead and conslder onl:! the specializations
of the three pairs of legs ••••
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The worker Bee's prothoracic (front) legs show
the following specializations. The femur and tib:ra
are covered with long, bra:r..ched FEATHERY LAIRS which
aid in ga th.6ring pollen when the Bee visi ts flowers:
the tibia, near its junc tion wi t'cl the t8r SlJ S (the
foot or hand), bears a group of stiff bristles (POLLEN BRUSH) which is used to brush together tJ:e pollen
grains that have been dislodged by the hairs of the
upper leg-segr(ionts. On the op1i.d~i te side of the leg
is a co:njJosi te structure, the Al{T~nlJA CLEAW:m, formed
by a movable plate-like process (VBLTJM) of the tibia
which fits over a circular notch in the uDper end of
the tarsus. The notch is provided '.'tith a series
of bristles which form the teeth~f the ANTEHNA cmm.
The antennae, or 'feelers,' which are important sense
organs of the head, are cleaned by being placed in
the toothed notch and, after the velum is closed
down, drawn bet"Neen the bristles and the edge of
the velum. On the anterior face of the first segment of the tarsus is a series of bristles (EYE
BRUSH) which is used to remove pollen and other particles adhering to the hairs on the head about the
la~ge compound-eyes and interfering with their operation. The terminal segment of the tarsus of each
leg is~rovided with 9. T)I'lL-' of notched CLlr.¥S, a
sticky pad (PULVILLUS) and TACTILE FLAIRS. When the
Bee is walking up a rough surface, the pOints of the
claws catch and the pulvillus does not touch, but
when the surface is smooth, so that the claws do
not ,r:;rip, they are drawn beneath the foot. This
change of position applies the yulvillus, a~d it
clinp;s to the smooth surface. Thus the character
of the surface automatlcally determines whether claw
or pulvillus shall be used. But there is another
adapta tio"'" equally remarkable. 'The pul villus is
carried folded in the middle, but opens out when applied
to a surface; for it has at its upper part an elas:bic and curved rod, which straightens as the pulvilIus is pressed down. The flattened-out pullrillus
thus holds stronr:rly while pulled alonp: the surface
by the weir:ht of the Bee, but comB8 up at 0'1ce if
lifted and-rolled off from its opposite Sides, just •
as we should pull a. wet postage starn;) from an envelope. The E:'ee, then, is held securely till it
attempts to lift the leg, when it is freed at on.ce;
and, by this exquisite yet simple plan, it can fix
and release each foot at least twenty times per second.' (Cheshire)
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The characteristic structures of the middle 0:13S0THORACIC) legs of the Bee are a small P01IJEN BRUSIoi' and
a long spine, or SPUR, which is em~loyed inremovinr,
flakes of wax from the \VAX POCKE'rS of the ventral
surface of the abdomen.
The METi~.:rp()RACIC (back) legs exhibit four remarkable adaptations to the needs of tl:.e insect, ~mO\m
aR the POLLEN COM~S, PECTEH, A1lH1CIJ:~, and POLLEN
BAs:r:ST. The pollen combs comprise a series of rows
of bristle-like hairs on the inner surface of the
first segment of the tarsus:- the pecten i;;3 a series
of spines on the distal e~d of t~e tibia which is
opposed by a concavity, the auric.le, on the proximal
end of the tarsal segment; while" the pollen basJret
is formed by a depression on the outer surface of the
tibia which is arched over by rows of long curved
bristles rurising from its edges.
TroIS the worker is fully equipped. Flying from
flower to flower for nectar, the Bee brushes against
the anthers laden vd th pollen, some of which adheres
to the hairs on its r)Qdy and legs. While still in
the field, the pollen combs are first brought into
play to comb the pollen from the hairs, while the
pectens scrape the 9011en from the combs. Then the
auricles are manipulated so that the accumulating mass
of pollen is pushed up into the bristle-covered pollen baskets. This process is repeated until the
baskets are full and then the lnsect returns to the
hive, wrere the cO.~.tents of the pollen baskets are
removed by the aid of the spurs wi th which the mesothoracic legs are provided.
Moreover, the structural adantations of the worker
Bee are but one aspect of a reCiprocal fitness.
Liany of the flowers which the Bee visits show remarkable adaptations for the reception of the Bee and
for dustins it with pollen, because Bees are effective
agents in the transferring of pollen from flower to
flower and thus insuring cross-fertilization. 9
The marvel011s aptitude of aV)imals for their environment would be in vain if the envirorunent on its part
were not at least to some extent accommodated to it.
Henderson elaborates the sui tabili t:'T of the earth and

I
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its elements to receive and foster the living beings
dwell upon it.
it expands at .4

The peculiar
0

:9rOpert~l

~l1at

of water by which

centigrade thus pre'Tenting the seas

from freezing solid and making sea life impossible is
but one of the many phenomena trea~.

There are th~ee

elements, hydrosen, carbon, and oxygen whose properties
are especially suited to sustain living organisms.

•

deed they largely constitute living things.

In-

Of the three

Fe"derson wri tea:
They lead ••• to the presence of water end carbon
dioxide in the at~osphere, and to the meterorological
cycle. This cycle reGulates the temperature of the
globe more perfectly thar: it could he regulated by
any other substances concerned in any similar cycle.
It produces an almost constant temperature in the
ocean, as well as constancy of composition and of
alkalinity. It mobilizes allover the earth great
quantities of all the elements; it rleposits them
in great variety and inexhaustible profusion in the
oec~an;
it comminutes and disperses all kinds of
insoluble minerals, thereby diversifying tbe land;
it causes water to penetrate and to remain in nearly
all localities; and all of tbese processes are more
perfect or more extensive than they could be if a
large nmnber of the differert properties of water were
not-what they are. Thereby the n::reatest variety and
quantity of structural materials is accumulated.
I(leanwhile the conditions which make for d1.lrabili ty of
structures are also assured •••
These and many other thinr"s depend upon properties of hydrogen, carbon, a:1r1 o:XY2~en. They make up,
I cannot doubt, the most rema:r,}rable group of causes
of the teleolor:;:tcal appearance of nature. 10
About carbon also Professor Greenwood has written recently::

I

r----------------------------------------36
It may be justly said that, if one tring more than
another stands unique and in majestic aloofness,
physicall:T speaking, in the cosmic scheme, it is ~he
eTement carbon. There does not a)pe9.r to be a s:~np.;le
as s:i.gnable reas on for such remarl:able propertie s as
those possessed by carbon (over and above an~ totally
distinct fro:m others) unless :Lt vlere deliberately
provided in a plannud scheme that it should in dl l e
time play the role it does. Eor is this any more
fantastic a claim than when Sl... liLvan says the electron
behaves as if it had foreknowled~e and could calculate
to an ama~in~ extent. Yet for thousands of millions
of years, in~our own solar system alone, the carbon
atom has played its 1jart just like ar.;-T other atom,
rather IH:e silicon in its ha~')it~, as it ',vere, 11l1til
life appeor ed. The opr)ortunj. ty arose, no element
save carbon could supply the fow1dation for that
as tounding quali ty we c all life, '.Tnt it ';'las t"here,
read~T to hand 1,'lhen the nee d car;1e.
The s tory of carbon is y:'.ore prirning,· ;;:ore brea th-taYJ.ng th8.n any
fiction. Yet there are those who refuse to see any
sio:nific2.nce i~ this, or a~"y purpose behind it 0.11.11
'Hhen we descend below the level of living beings
f:l.nd enter t1,e

anor:~anic

world, there is no further example

of conscioUS ir.1manent adaptation.

Yet the marvelous de-

signs and determined activities of crystals, molecules,
ared a tOl~lS leave our ar8l'.I1ent

frO~:il

analoGY anel sufficient

roason valid and stronr even in the physical world.
VIb.erlever

t'.'JO

elements cOJrlbine to fClrm a compound,

they always do so according to
W0lf':ht.

~eflnite

Eight ounces of oxycen and

or~e

proportions by
ounce of

h:Tdror~<:n

will always combine in this proyortion and in no other
to form nine ouY-,ces of water.

Thou{h the law of com-

binB tion is stran:7e enough, tLe ato,;:ic tYceory w}-dch
exnlains it is still

~ore remarka~la.

Dalto~,

takinG

I
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a hint from theories of the old atoy.1ists of Greece, drew
up his atomic theory under the su:oposition that the elements were made up of atoms, ar'd that compounds were made
'Jf

more or less stable aggregates of atorn.s.

Furtbermore,

that all atoms of one element differ.from
tb.ose of another •
.,. ...,.
To form a compound, therefore, a few atoms of on.e element
were supposed to combine with a few atoms of another so
as to form aD aggregate.

This repre st n ted the smallest

uni t of a compound ·Vllbich ca.me to be called a molecule_
The Greek mechaDists had indeed thought of atoms, but
tbey had never imagined that they

combi~ed

in definite

proportions, nor could tbey haV3 deduced it logically from
their system, for they supposed that all atons had the· same
properties, and, denying finality,

they could have assign-

ed no reason why the atorns cOl'l'l combine only in exact
small proportions.
A further development of the atomic theor;T ca'ITIe
when .'\vogadro proposed the molecular theory of gases_
I

The si1:'.ple pro:!Jortions existing between the component
parts of a gas and between each part and the whole volume
were explained by supposing tbat j.n any Gas under constant
tem.pera ture and pressure there were equal numbers of
:r101ecules no matter from how many atoms the molecvles
were made up_

This theory, now held as incontestably

correct, added several pieces of inforf'lation to the former
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knowledge of the atomic theory.

By it the relative

.'

~nd

absolute weir;ht of the atoms could be calculated, the

exact number of atoms in a molecule, and, hence, chemical
formulae could be determine d.

Prom t:his theory also arose

the notion of vale"lces.
Orderly patterns likewise abound in crystals.
A cursory cornparlson of the shapes

01. a

collection of

crystals would 10 ad one to believe that there is an almost
infinite variety of' forms.

3ut in reality the forms of

all crystals may be reduced to seven systems depending
upon what are called their axes.

rrhe first or cubic

system has all its axes the same length, and all at
right angles to each other.
tal of this class.

Cormnon table salt is a crys-

Numerous examples could be given of

all the other classes, the tetragonal, the orthorhoMbic,
the monoclinic, the triclinic, the tr:Lgonal, and the
hexagonal.

All snow crystals have the general pattern

of a hexagon, yet marvel of variety, more than four thousands of them he.ve been photographed,
having been found alike.

v~.

thout any two

The forms are so intricate

and beautiful that they have often been copied as patterhs
for fine lace.
But the design of the crystal does not consist
merely in the symmetry of its visible form.

By the

I
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~£very

chemical compound has its own peciJ.liar

structur~

and

Y'lOre than three hm1.ored thousands of them are lrnown to
chemists.

By the structure form of its molecule any

substance may be distinguished from o.ny other substance.
;;.

...

The varied forms of cryste.ls a!Jd chemical structures
are due to orderly arrane;ments of a.toms.
the a tom itself is probably more

aOl11~able

The structure of
than even

that of crystals and molecules, but it is less well

l~nown.

Roughly, there are two parts to the atom, a nucleus and
~~

outer region of electrons.

The nucleus carries a

positive electrical charge, and in it is centered most
of the weieht of the atom.

In recent years there has

been some evidence that atoms may be composed of as high
as six parts.

All except the electrons seem to come from

the nucleus of the atom, while the latter, ranging from

,.

one to ninet7-two in number, are situated in orbits around
the nucleus.
Though we could wish our l-<:l1owledr;e of the atom to
be more complete, already enough is

l~nown

to ma}{e us

realize that infinitesimal portions 'of matter contain
wo!-,ders of sY;lme try and order comparable perhaps to the
vast visible order of the stars and of our solar

s~rstem.

I
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denying an ultimate directive Intelligence.

.

may say

tt any

.'

Still, we

view that regards the universe as realizing
3

ends or values is a form Of'teleology.1t
The opposing camp is made up of all materialists,

....

of course; and, largely, of scientific mechanists and
mechanistic evolutionists.

These, instead of admitting

tha t the world tends or is direc ted ,oward nr. end, say
rather that every present phono:rlenon is fully accounted
for

b~

a preceding fact or a series of preceding f'acts.

No matter what the method of' evolution may have been,
ultimately it was merely a redistribution of matter, force,
and motion or energy.
deny final causes.

They admit ef'ficient causes but

Results are had but no finality.

liJechanism in this modern form owes its origin to Descartes.
Denying substantial forms he made the essence of corporeal
substance consist in extension.

From this it followed

that a body has no intrinsic prit1ciple of change and
activity, and is only capable of receiving local motion
from some extrinsic source.

Such a theory is obviously

onnosed to intrinsic finality.
mere machines.
is denied.

Batural bodies become

An internal principle of self -perfection'

This ttscientif'ic" atti tude with the added

notion of evolution, to both of which he agrees, is
colorfully surrnned up by Willie.m ,Tames in his Varieties
of Religious Experience:

I
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She (science) catalogues her elements and records
her laws indiffere"1t as to what purpose may be shown
forth b;T them, and constructs her tr1eories qui te
careless of their bearlng on hml1an anxieties and
fates. Though the scientist may individually nourish a religion, and be a theist in his irresponsible
hours, the days are over when .i~ could be said that
for Science herself the heaven13 ~eclare the glory of
God and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Our
solar system, with its harmonies, is seen now as but
one passing case of a certain sort of moving equilibrium in the heavens, realized by a local accident
in an appalling wilderness of wofllds 'HLere no life
can exist. In a span of time which as a cosmic interval will count but as an hour, it will have ceased
to be. The Darwinian notion of chance production,
and subsequent destruction, speedy or deferred, applies to the largest as well us to the smallest facts.
It is impossible, in the -present temper of the scientific imagination, to find in the driftings of the
cosmic atoms, whether tbey work on the universal or
on the particular scale, anythinG but a kind of
aimless weather, dOing and undoing, achieving no
proper history, and leaving no result. Nature has
no one distinguishable ul t~; tla te tendency wi th which
it is possible to feel a sympathy. In the vast
rhythm of her processes, as the scientific mind now
follows them, she appears to cancel herself. 4
Still, there are not many mechanists who will deny
the fact of nature's order.

Many of them are as enthus-

iastic about it as are teleologists.

Indeed, if all

idea of purpose were removed from nature, they would be
the first to admit its order.

It is they who have for-

mula ted most of the laws of nature.

Teleologists have

often enough capitalized upon t:heir findings to strengthen
their own position.
order.

No, the disagreement is not about

V{bere the two schools part ways is in accourLting

I
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tonishine; results.

The pur sui t of the exact

sciences~,

however, is not the only characteristic of mechanism.
Iflechanism is also a s-:rstem of philosophy.

It does not

remain in science and material things, its field of
specializa tion, but reaches up

in'lJ6)'~hilosophy,

where

problems are decided by reason and not by experiment.
Its renown in
.,
science lends a specious glow to its false philosophy.

In this thin air, mechanism suffocates.

In this masquerade the unpracticed eye mistakes mechanistic philosophy for the truth.

Thus when the mechanist

claims to measuxe matters of mind, will, and morality
with meter

sti~k

and formula, he really convicts himself

of childishness, but his prestige in his own field makes
it hard to defend common sense views against him.
Teleology, on the other hand, labors pnder difficulties peculiar to itself.

First of all, it has the

disadvantage of having come first.

Theories that have

come down to us from primi ti ve ages are often classed
by the uncritical as necessarily superstitious.

Second-

ly, finality is said to operate only throuchan intellect,
and yet we set out to establish finality in nature as
far as possible without reference to a Supreme Intellect.
Thirdly, because there are many

insta~ces

of apparently

unordered activity; the dust, for example, that is scat-

I
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tered by the ,'Vind;

the formation of the clouds;

lanches, waterfalls, volcanoes;
living things, monsters.
a stone from your hand.

and in the realm of

A mechm1ist may say, "drop
Impelled by a physical force

it tUlilble s to tfl.e f5I'0und.
is there a final cause?
nothing 1''1ore. t1

.'

ava-

Where :4!'..,the purpose?

V'fuere

I see an efficient cause and

Of course one might answer tha t the per-

son who dropped it had a purpose.

.

But let us say that

the stone after lodging for centuries on the side of a
mountain, oroke loose one morning and went crasb.ing down
the precipices.

Where was the purpose?

had weakened its SlJpport.

Rain and erosion

The force of cravity over-

balanced the equilibrium, and it fell.

But purposely?

Should we, then, abandon attempts to prove finality
in the inorganic world m1d limit ourselves to the plant
and animal kingdoms?

If we desert the inorganic we ad-

mit defeat in the widest sector of the field.

If there

is no finality in the inorga'1.ic world, if it is governed
merely by efficient causes, it will be an easy matter
to extend the

ar~urnent

to orf':ar. ic nature and even to man.

The Mechanist will say: I It is the same l'Ta ture workine; mechanically in all the kingdoY:1s of the world;
which sleeps in the mineral, slumbers in the plant,
dreams in the animal, and awal:es in man. The insect
moves because it has powers of locomotion, the bird
flies because it has wings, men and brutes see because
they have eyes, and reproduce their kind and perpet-

I
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uate their species because they have organs of ge~
eration.' It will not suffice for us to challenge
him with the retort:
'What precisely do you mean
by Nature?' Our task will be to prove that the bird
has wines in order to fly, t~'1a t men and brutes have
e;Tes in order to see, and sexual organs j_n order
to reprodl'_ce their kind. Is this tasl~ ec.sier than
that of proving the existence of final causes in
tIle inorganic world, the world.~ stones, water, sun,
moon, and stars? A victory in tl'l.e lower kingdom
will make easy a triumph in the hisher. 5
We have said when speaking of,the avalanche that it
seemed to proceed wi thout purpose.

If we are told that

there is disorder in the ·world, therefore, no finali ty,
we have a greater right to say that there is a far greater
amount of order in the world than disorder, therefore,
there is a greater reason for admi ttinr; purpose, the
foundation of order.

For our argument we lean especially

upon the conspiracy of causes that go to make
intrinsic order of nature.

~lp

the

li;any examples were described

in the previous chapter.
There we saw the geometrical structures of the
atoms, molecules, ar:.d IJrystals.

If atoms merely COllle

togetl1er, and form molecules and cr:',Tstals,
and not also J::o form them, why the exact nmnbers for eac)J.
substance?

7fh~r

the symmetrical formations?

and stability of the molecule?

Eo1.1 the uni ty

How does one cell divide

and multiply till it becomes a full grown ·organism, and
why does the organism always quit growing after a certain

I
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period of development?

..

And, a.gain, how can we say tha.t

when an orga.nism is wounded the cells nerely :r1ul tiply
but not in order to heal the wound?

ltfhy should the

bee's legs be so delicately and so finely adjusted if
it were not in

.()E_~er

to carry polle:rl.f

In other words, we offer to the nlechanis t ca.ges
whe:re apparently, there has been a cj}1spiracy of causes
to produce a definite, determined effect.

If he would

admi t a real conspiracy he would Dot dif.fer from

1JS.

But if he contends that the consniracy of causes is only
apparent, he must fall back on one of two explanations.
He may say that those physical, that Is, efficient causes
cooperate

b~T

mere chance, or he may ;;ay--and this is his

best argument--tha t the apparent

of caUGes is no

Doolinc~

more th2..n a case of physical forces added to physical forces, from which only physical forces may be eXl?ected to
result.

It is this force, according to

h~m,

that pro-

duces the apparently purposed effect.

I

In the beginning we may challenge the universal
statement that physical forces Fldded to ph7sical forces
give only a sma total of physical forces.

Is it not pos-

sible that prescinding from the forces in question, the very
conbination of ca1].ses is a phenomenon that requj.res the
intervention of a final cause?

Certainly it is a uhenomL

.

~
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.'

key to natrue's order and the designer of her manifold
pa tterns.
The

othe~

possible explanation of order and deter''Ier-

...

mined activities and effects is the stil;t more absurd
.,
recouY.'se to crance. A deus ex machina explanation of a
phenomenon is r.early always an admission of ir:::norance.
The

of the chance account of.order Etnd, in-

-.1.-

deed, of the 8listen.ce of the whole universe is based on

!ten

plausibilit~

the fact that some things in the world do hapDen by chanofLnce.
The inference is supposed to be: "Therefore everything
happens by chance."

A few words, therefore, on the pos - - -

sibili ty of explaining intrinsic order by chance will noto_ot
be out of place,
Chance fu"ises from the coincitience of two or more e e
causes acting independently of each other, or from the
coincidence of effects which have been independently
produced.

The eruption of Vesuvius was caused by an
I

explosion in tbe earth w:bich happened accordinp' to natural laws.

The ci ty of Pompeii Vias Dlaced near Vesuvius as

purposely.

Rut its being buried under Vesuvius' lava

was accidental. Thus,

evidently, the scholastic thesis
8

on final i ty does 'lot say that no thin£; happens by

chance~

bu t, ra ther, trat no t everything happens by chanc e •

It

is ?:lot possible tha t everything should happen by chance

6
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e the accidental
is accidental.
of two

presUIX1!I!~eSUpposes
Chanc~~LiU1nce

iml~e

All

is the result of an acciden-

cause~IDuses,

'.'Ihich is beside the

the intentional.

and is, therefore, an

intention or natural tenden.cies

acting causes.
There are at leas t thrd three phenomena which chance can7
1) Persistence.,e:lmce. Even if.i t were possible
couJJr~)Could

the order of nature

have resulted from a fortu-

colloca tion of chemica]J21.D..cal matter, the same principle
not account for the

continuance of order.

com~

Our intel-

naturally distihgl.lishes

~dhes

between events that happen

and unexpectedly, and

Dll~nd

those which happen regularly.

morning a tile falls

~:o.ls

near me as I pass a certain

.... \.L.L,u!'.,

I

will suppose that;Jsitthat it was an accident and think

it.

But if it ben:ibdlJegins to happen regularly every

evan if I were a
icious intention.

mec~el

mechanist I should soon suspect

2) UruijO Unity of effect from multipli-

The human eY1;ern eye is

1 all the parts that
, iris, punil, cornea,

mUS2li~
SCO!

~

good example of thi s.

must cooperate.
II!!II

The muscles,

sclerotic coa t, the rods and cones,

s numerous other

factoMok~tors

which must unite to pro-

the one effect of

seei~jE3ing.

Such unity of effort on

the causes

towar~~\Nards

a definite effect cries

a sufficient reaS8wreason.

Whence comes it unless

I
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If both sides had listened to their a.udiences they would
have heard the right answer.

To the German philosophers

the people would have said, "Dust thou art, and to dust
returnest;"

and for the instruction of the English

would have empha.tically added,
This is the

CO!!1I'lOn

nWas;;.r~t

spoken of the soul."

sense answer and it is the answer of

scholastic philosophy.

When the extremist inquires into

the causes of the world he will ask, ~re there only final
causes in the universe, or are there only efficient causes?"
He always feels tb,a t by the adJl1ission of one of tvro opposites
the other is necessarily excluded even when the opposites
may not be at all contradictory.

But if we place our

original problem, whether birds fly because they have wings,
or have vangs in order to fly, before the oracle of common
sense,

t.re

response will be brief but sure, 'tHot either,

but both."
Certainly, the bird would never fly if its wings
were not mechanical struct1..U'es of a kind that would be
sufficient to help it overcome the
the resistance of the air.

:.~,ull

of grav.i ty and

But it would also seem that

no matter how it .came to have Wings, whether bye volution
or by immediate creation, it has them also
fly.

Else why should it have wi!1e;s at all?

~n ~rde~

to

This is

no more strange than my using an automobile to ri.de to
work every morning.

The machine, indeed, is mechanical,

I
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but I have bought it and I use it for a purpose.

Thus.,

there is no di ,'ficulty in admi tting both final and efficient causes.

Indeed, the trouble has always come when

one or the other was denied.

They

.JD.ot work separately.

CD. 1

Except in the case of God, the Fir 3it"""Cause , Who is not
influenced by any cause outside Himself, the final and
efficient ca ' "J ses s.re alwa.ys found together.

-.

tlThe causal-

ity of the idea, or final causality is not adequately
distinct from efficient causality.
operate apart from the latter.
2
to it a direction."

II.

The former does not

It completes it, adding

The Logical Objection.

In assigning causal

efficacy to ends, one of the diff'icultj.8s which arise
immediately is how the end which in some cases does not
yet exist, end in no case exjsts in so .far as it is a
cause, can be the cause of sorre thin,~ that will exi st
in the future.

Professor Hobhouse puts the difficulty in
3

the question tt:!)oes the non-existent cause the existent?"
To illustrate he proposes the case of a di.:1ner which,
considered as

~~

end, would be the cause of a series of

actions ne ces sary toe 011vey one from his office to hi s
home.

He then asks, but what of the udinner which does

not come off?'·
If

0.

mechanist offered th:1.s difficulty we could

I

60

parry by saying that tre past by which he attempts to .'
explain the present is just as non-existent as the f1Jtt1re.
However, if VIe tr7r to offer a more rational explanation,
our first observat,ion will be that e viden tly there is no
differe!1.ce whatever as far as causai:L"t-y is concerned
whether the meal was served or not as long as the person
concerned

~houl:Pt

it would be awaiting biw.

"

a fact that we all :'nov{ from experience.
if the end exists in the mind.

This much is

It is sufficient

Here yre have the answer

to our problem in so far as one can be given.

It is not

a case of non-being causing being, but it is the case
of a possible being apprehended as good inducing the ef'ficient cause to produce or obtain it, or, at least, to
try to bring it into actuality or possession.

The Br-

roneous conception produces the necessary actions to attain the end until the error is rectified.

The execution

or acquisition of the end in case of error may remain
incomple te.

The di fficulty is J.ess severe if we remember
I

tbe nature of the appetite which corre sponds to the f1 nal
cause.

From tre very first monent of our existence

we are inclined towards the good.

ThUS, we are, as it w$re"

already off dead center in the direction of the end,
which is convertible with good, before it is concei ved
in t he mind.
an objective.

This a1 so helps us to see the causal :'1a tLlre of
Perhaps it less

th~n o~e

might have imagin-
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ad.

It determines, directs, diverts the appetite

whic~

by nature already tends towards good in general.
The

abov~

remarks have been an endeavor to explain

briefly the manner in which the

non-~xistent

(not the

non-real) influences the agent which will bring it to
actuality.

Perhaps a more satisfactory answer would be

desira9le, but the difficulty loses m.ch of its force
the moment we recoe;nize the certainty of the fact.
Even the fact cannot be admi tted by

8.

pure materialist,

but it is evident to anyone who admits mind.

The mind

can look to tre future and plan .just as easily as it can
look to the past and remember.
Once

t~e

problem is solved for

intelli~ent bein~s

there is no difficulty for natLu'Ial bodies, for although
their principle of direction is innate in them, ultimately they are deter'mined to their end by another who has
mind.
I

III.

The Anthropomorphic Objection.

The anthro-

pomorphic objection runs as follows: "the whole idea of
purpose or end is derived from human psychology, and ••••
only human conceit would make bold to read the cosmic
process in terl!lS analogous to hl.D:lan experience. It

4

Before we can discuss this difficulty intelligent-
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11 we must come - Ble to s orne agreement on a defini tiorl. of
anthropomorphism

ing:

mB

sm.

Baldwin f s

D~?ti_~l~:Y

.'

ei ves the fo110w-

AnthropomoIon.morphism is 'tthe assumption of hur:J.an beings
cH~

tbB. t tl-:e ir own

- characteristics are present in beings

or

fe-cts widely ov,y different from them1!~ves, mope )13.rticu1ar5
11 in gods or in nr in the forces of nature. U
The word has

'most frequently

1i~y

been used in the history of religion

••

to denote a tendebrr ndency in early peoples, especially the
ancient (freeks, -I' to attribute hunan bodies, passions,
needs, faults,

a..r<~

a.."'1C1

charo.c teris tics to their gods.

The

word is also useoeased to signify the a ttributing of tb.ese
'seme

c:r.aracterisf~tistics

to rdembers of the animal, plant,

("

~r mineral '''lOrJd.bOd.

'liVe must

cs~

carefully distinguish this use of the word

trom the doctrinenline of analogy.

It is impossible for us to

8peak of the Inf:R1rnfinite Being, for example, exce:;Jt in terms
deri ved from hU}11sriklll11an experience.

We say that He is 'Beine,

:that He bas inteI9;l:;e11ect, will, life, personality, becP.l'se
we can prove fromo'rom reason that these are essential qualities
'Of a '1ecessary bed being.

notions first

fro",~ro:tl

It is true that we draw these

our own experience.

out vlhen we apply

them to God we dab do not mean that He l')ossesses them in the
lame sense or degstlegree in which we T)03SeSS tYem.

We speak

(

~a1ogous1y, not jot anthropomorphically.
~,

We predicate a

I

63
inde~d,

human property to a being that is not human, not,

in a univocal sense, sut understanding that there will
be at least a partial similarity, but Dossibly a far
greater dissimilarity.
Let us now turn our attention to finali'by.

When

teleologists are accDsed of anthropomorphism the objection
may be understood in two senses:

fir$t, it may be an

imputation of real anthropomorphisn.

Whenever there is

evidence for this error the accusation is just.

But

if it is taken in a broader sense by which it would mean
that because we first get the notion of p·l).rpose from
human experie 11ce it is illicit to apply it to a being of
any other nature, in other words, if it wishes to make
anthropomorphism

sJ"TIon~1lnous

wi th analogy, j.t misunderstands

the natnre of hrL."1Tlan thought, and underestim.ates its value.
1~e

could hardly r:et outside of ourselves wi thout the use

of analogy. The Humane Society would not be so solicitous
for the care of dumb animals if it did not think they feel
pain in a way similar to that in which men suffer.
they

ca~

know this o'''ly through analogy.

':Jut

1.r1e can know

that other men think the same way that we do only by the
perfect analogy we see existing :)etweeIl their words and
actions and our own.
Hence, al though the argur.-18nt from sufficient

I
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reason is the strongest argument for finality in
the analogical arrsument is valid.

nature~

•

Scientists continually

make use of the principle that like causes produce like
effects.

The principle is just as valid if turned around:

"Like effects have like causes."

T:Qe...teleolorrist sees

the order and adaptation in nature.

nBut order, n he

argues, "or at least continuous and persistent order is
always the result of purpo se.

•

Therefore, tJ'iere is pur-

pos e in the world. It
IV.

The Dysteleological Objection.

There are facts that seem to point to a purpose.
There are as many more facts that seem to point to
an indifferent or malevolent universe. To select
the teleolop:ical facts while ignoring the dysteleological is to deceive oneself. 'Teleolo~y is an
illusion.' 6
This is a broad ob,iection opposing the whole problem
of evil to tre arguments for finali ty in the world.

.....

This

is truely the most serious objection to a metaphysics
of finality.

It is not that any other system, whether of

monism, mechanism, or pantheism can explain tt better,
or even as well, but after all has been said that can be
said, there still remains the fact of evil in the world,
and its l.llt:i.mate Uwhylt is a m;Tstery.

It is evident that

the world is not the best possible, absolutely speaking,
as Leibnitz supposed.

But God

DaS

created the world for

I
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reasons of His own, and we can be certain that He created
4fi

at least relatively the finest ',ossi18 Vlorld, i.e., the
one best suited to accomplish His own inSCrlJtable designs.
Since it is not given us to fathom the intentions of the
Infinite Wisdom in creating the

lm~V&rSe,

naturally there

will be certain factors in it the purpose of which we will
not be able to

understan~.

not a denial of plJrPO se.

~ut

ignorance of purpose is

•

Certainly we have found uses

for tbings which in the oast were considered purposeless.
However, we lY'ust s till account for thi.ngs tha tare certHinly evil.

The answer here must be limited to "uhvsical
~

evils, but correct general notions qf evil will also be
applicable to moral deordinations.
The nature of evil can be brou[;ht out more clear ly
by contrasting it wi tl:. essential or o;'ltological

n~oodness.

Good is that which is suitable or desirable to any nature.
Good in this sense is

cooxtensi ve wi th being, for there is

no being for vtlich at least existence is not suitable or
desirable.

Good, too, is closely connected vii th end,

for that is Good for a being which perfects it, i.e.,
Which helps it attain its end.
good in this rela tionship.

::Ve continually think of .

"fha t do we mean vJ'nen we say

that a rifle is good or that a bird dog is good except
that they oe

(~ood

for the end for 'Nhich they are intended?

Every end is in some sense good, and every good could be

I
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considered under tlJ.e aspect of end.

.'

Thus

the two formulae, 'The good is t1:at which beings
de sire, or towards which they na tl,;~ral17T tend, ,
and 'The goorl is that which is adapted to the ends
which beiEGs have in their existence,' really come to
the same t:Cillg;' tb~ former statement resolving itself
into the latter as more fundamwal. 7
In the concrete ['ood is identic::.l with any real -;eing,
for

t~lere

is no -aeing wl::.ich c::mnot bE\ cO,lceived as the

term either of its own appetite or as the term of some
other beine's appetite.
If· everything is ontolog5_cally good, it follows
that there can be no. being which is e'11"l.

And this is

the scholastic teaching in spite of its admission of evil
in the vlorld.

As good is to be identified vd th being,

so evil is iden.tical with 1:.on-being,:Clot, however, with
absolute nothinG, b1.Jt with tlabsence of the good which
8
Just as TIe never see
color alone but only colored objects, so evil as such or
as a positive reality separate from a subject of inherence
9

simply does not exist.
are always wi th us.

Disease, blindness, WEtr, death

They are never alone, however, but

10
always in some subject.
Wi th these preliminary notions about the

.nll ture

of

evil, the reconciliation of teleology with physical evil
in the world nay be treated with dispatch.

I
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1)

Evil, as VIe have seen, is always seated in.,

a subject, therefore, in a good.

This is sufficient to
11

answer those wbo imagine a totally male"lolent universe.
2)

....

IiIany things that are apparently useless or

even harmful rra::' serve unknovm purposes.
endocrine glands, for

exren~)le,

Some of the

were 10':1.8 thouE;ht to be

mere vestiges, but are now knovm to ltave useful functions.
3)

rrhere are many cases where the evil is so

rela ti ve tha t t he Good occasioned by the evil is obviously equal or greatep than the damage done.

lilan and cer-

tain animals must inflict death on other animals and on
plants to provide themselves with food.
is life to the other.

Death to one

Besides, what overcrowding we

should soon have if no animals on ear th ever died?

4)

The metaphysical reason 'Nhy evil does not con-

tradict teleology is that nothing ever tends towards evil
as an end (unless under the appeapance of a Good~

Evil

is related to teleology in aJ.r10st the sane way as chance.
It always results accidentally, or at least secondarily
to the primary tendency.

Whatever evil or flaw there ;nay

be in any effect is the result of defect in the prinCiple of a ction.

Hence, St. Aur:us tine says tha t nevil
12
has not an efficient cause but only a deficient one."

I
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Thus, if a monster is born it :Ls due to a defect in bhe
primary cells or in the genital organs of the parent or
to some similar disorder, and not to a
in the embryo towards imperfection.
;;,

...

n~tural

tendency

Such a diseased

embryo still tends towards its end and natural perfection.
It tends, however, only in so far as it is sr. operative
princj.ple, and not in so far as it il defective.

Thus,

when an agent fails to attain its end, it is not a sign
of a false tendency towards defect or destruction.

It is

because of failure to act completely, or because its action was thwarted by some cou..."1teractivity.
to reach the end is evil.
of the natural tendency.
13
stances.

This failure

But the evil is not the object
It is due, rather, to circum-

Still, it :may be urged, explain it how you will,
evil remains.

This is true, arld the teleological 'Norld-

view is not so radically optimistic as to deny it.

But

the fact of evil vall remain no r'lstter what system of
philosophy one adopts.

It is that system which can best

explain evil and all the other difficulties tl::.at should
be accepted.

The scholastic teleologist is convinced

that his system labors under tbe fewest inherent difficulties.

v.

.....

The Evolutionary Objection.

I
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The theory of evolution has re jected the 'spe<'ial
creation' theory •••• Evolution has also explained the
adapta tions to environment by the tlteory of natural
selection •••• Hence present adaptations are not the
work of a cr-eator 'Nho made orr;anisTI1s as they are,
fully eqld;)!)ed for the battle of life, but they are
the result of a sifting-process, which involves the
apparently aimless birth and ~eitruction of countless
maladjusted or poorly equirrped org:-, uisms •••••
In another direction evoh,tioll seemed to undermine
belief in a world-purpose. TrnrH tional philosophy
and theolocy had usually regnrded the :!:mrpose or
purposes embodied in the univers\ as etel"nal Hna unchangine •••• The theory of evolution has laid rude
hands upon thifl ark. It sees in change and gro'wth
and tm emerp;erlce of genuine novel tie s the mos t
characteristic features of our world.
If evolution be
true, the real i ty that e!l1bodie s i tse If in the '.'10rldprocess cannot be et,=::rnally static. 14
The first of the above objections mfty be resolved
into two parts:

1) thB rejection of the "special creation"

theol"Y in favor of t}le evolution of s'gecies.

2) The af-

fir:nation that evolution of species involves the aimless
birth and destruction of countless maladjusted organisms.
It 'Jilill not be possible here to c ons1der tr_ese
theories historically, nor

exhau3t~vely

I

in any sense.

But let us for a moment turn on each one the light of a
little 10[:lc in order to see

hOI"!

the~T

.

affect the ar:::;uments

'which, we maintain, prove the objectivity of f1nal causes
in nature.
First of all, the "special creation U theory must
be carefully distinguished from the absolute or direct
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creation of the matter of the world wi th i t8i.i. ts laws and.'
order.

co'~,'ld

katter

fror..: 'lop-matter.
~l;'llprer:.nable

tbe

not of its own f)OVlOr har. ha'le arison

r.r':<is phil02wpll.1cal ,;ost~:la~, :late based on

nrinciple of causali t~T is

of sciel~tific evolu tion.

In regard t~

be;Tond the realm

'08.;

"ine

B evoluti on of

S

the species vIe should distini"uish between tHI the orip:in

...

of the first soo
of thosG2c;:Jse species which
. cies and the ori'dn
"
r~ave

s'J,pposedly developed from preexistinCi 0[3 ones.

rec,pect to the f'i,rst species there is the pur
life came from non-life.
past and
bee~1.

prese~lt

~1.0

probleD} of :row

Scienc:e has proveo8vved tba t a l l

tl'..eories of spontaneous

p:er:e~eneration

hDve

Philosophy also ca.1Js our a ttenfjj~ntion to tbe

myths.

fact tl,at

For with

being can Give to 8.nother what jss,t itself does

not in some wa7 possess.

To state the

cont~,ntrary

to hold that entity could come from nor-ent:jrm.tity.

would be
lilatter

mir'ht have developen. some Simple orgc.nizatiolttion which would
be

,:"1

fA. voral;le rece tacle f or life.

had to corle

8,

flash of life.

Eut at

jr.;a t

one time there

':['he orly e xpl~li[Plana tion of
I

t[lis first '1i tal flash which coincides wi th ftth the princiDles of logic and tbe findin"?s of science
act.

It would n.ot necessarily be creatiO'l

e~ce
:r~'I

is a creative
in tbe stric#t

sense, a s in the crea tio!l, of ,ila tter, for th-r!tthe :ma tter would
already be at hand.

It could ")e ',"That is

ROl"fo~o1J1etimes

called

l,t:;

secondary creation or Divine Admicllstrationnoon.

Thus, strict-

1:1 speaking, the question of eVolution and :bd finality is
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restricted to the appearance of new variations of
tive species for whose existence

'Ire

pr~i-

r'117e nssi,n'ned a suf-

ficient reason.
The

forepoin~
-'
-.

remarks

. ...

have.~een

laid dawn as a

foundation without which evolution ca)'1 rave no intelligible
meanin'-.

'1hen we look upon evolution as the s'Ystematic

Growth ~)'1d develoomeY) t of tlJe 'U..l1i vefse which took its
inception from the Greator, it
tic teleolog7

w~ether

~e

sa~

~atter3

little to scholas-

that each snecies was separ-

ately created or 'tlhether the new was sO!r1ef1.ow generated
ty the old.

It came ultimatel7 from the Creator, and,

logically, if there is development, it should be accordine; to Fis intention.

In this light, evolution is not

only not onposed to teleology, but furnishes Rnother argument in. its favor.
Nm"l to the

second DOint of the objection which

ma~r

be stated thus: 'In the process of evolution thousands
of lmfit plants and ar1imals pe:eish aimlessly.
fi t survive.'

Only the

Let us ask, Vlha t if none of the:t:1 did die?

i"ould finali ty ha'lTe a sounder basi s1

Or, would they not

destroy man whom they are intended to serve?

In the

supposition that no plants or animals would die, men
and animal s would have to Ii ve on water and the mi.nerals
of the earth as plants do, and plants would so multinl;T

I
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as to smother and crowd out men and animals, and, in«eed,
they would soon exhavst tr.1 e fertil1ty of the soil, which
in -She present system is partially replenishedl1;T the
corruntton of dead matter, and be doomed to starve.
conclusion is that unless some di~ '1.11 will die.
is 1'1ecessary that life may continue.

Our

Death

Therefore, while

.

death is t'he frustration of the immediate end of

"~he

individual, it is not a frustratj.on of the principle of
finality, as was explained in answer to the dysteleological objection.

Death serves rather a larger and more

ultimate end.
Darwin's theory of selection on which the objection
is basen cannot alone account for a tJ,eory of race-evolution.

To try to explain present species by pointing

out the. t the7T are the survivors of countle ss numbers

,..

tr..a t have ;)6rished, is almost like sa7ir..r: tha t there are
two hundred lenves on a certain tree becal)se all tbe
others have fallen off.

Thus, tllose who would unhold

I

that D8.rt of the Darwi:rlian theorv which tries to account
for the s·urvival of the fi t by the fall of the weak, have
yet toaccou1'lt for the 'arrival of t}le fit.'

If tl;ere

were no design in t;he world the falOt thHt h:T far the
majority arrive fit would be an insoluble problem.
If Darwinism be accepted in the loose sense of

i~r08. ter
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evolution in:-;:eneral, we min:ht I?r;ree wi tIl Darwin' s

s~

when he YvTi te s :
One of the lIT'ea tes t services re "'dered bv m'T father
to the study of natural historv is the rev~:'iJai of
teleoloO'y. 'The evolutionist s.h-1-dies the purpose or
meaning of organs wi th the zea" ....of the older teleology,
but VQ ttl far vvi der 8.~d more coherent Dur pose. He 1180 S
the invigorating 1-cnowledr;e tha t be is gaining, not
isol1'1.ted concentions of the economy of tbe present,
but a coherent view of both past and ~resent. And
even where }'e fails to disCOVEll-' the 1.1se of any Dart,
he may, by a lmowledr~e of j.ts structure, unravel
the history of the past vicissitudes in tbe life of
the species. In this wa;! a vip;or and unity is Kiven
to the study of the form of orGanized bei"1gs, whicl-:;.
before it lacked. 16
Rut Darwinism in the stricter an.d truer ser.se of
the word

accordh~r:

to ",{hich the evolution of species is

due eEtireJ.y to chailc e varia tio::ls is not comDa tible with
scholastic

teleolo~y.

Yet, while scholasticism Cal'1not accept DarWinism,
it finds in evolution itself
triCle of

teleoloi~.Y,

(10

co/'tradiction of its doc-

but a broadening and enoblinr; of the
I

concept.

There is a. prinCiple in scholastic philoso;:)hy

which says tr..at 'it is not permis8ible to postulate an act
of the Creator to expl2.in a pheno:nenon which may be aec€mnt.- 18
1Yhatever, therefore, caY)
ed for by natural causes.'
be explained by evolution must not be attributed to the
direct action of the Creator.

There is i':reater elabor-

ation of desien in an evolutionary system than in a
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s tp. tic ore.

4'

To plan out a lJ.ni verse of fini te en ti tie s, differinG
in essence and in grades of perfection, is doubtless
a work of sU"perhuman wisdom; but to include in the
design the furthel" idea, of conferri:1C on these entities
a complex va}'iet~r of forces, qrl,alitios, active a~:1d
passive, faculties by virtue &.f·...which nature could
ever grow out of itself B-nd developfrol1 lower to hir~her
forms-of existence, and should multiply along definite
lines of being;
to conceive a world wt~08e consti tvents would ceaselessly energize on one a!lOther, yet
wi thout confusion and in 8.;:1 adm~8ble order; to allow'
to the creature its own proper causal i ty, a~1d ye t,
even in snite of the manifold action of free will in
a countless multiplicity of immortal intelliG"ences,
to elaborate a nerfect uni ty;
surely this is an
incalculabl-y hin;her ~;}anifestatioE of wisdom. It serves
to manifest the DOl,'ler of the Creator; for every cause
is proportioned to tne effect. But the completion of
a desin;n such as has been described, is a more noble
effect than if e very production of natural operation
were the result of irnmediate creation. 19
Similar quota ti ons could be r,ml tiplied, but those
given will sul'flce to show that defendors of teleology
find nothin" incompatible between final CS1JSeS aEd a reasonable theory of evolution.
Little need be said in answer to the second objection.

When it speaks of the ttptlrpose or purposes em-

bodied in the universe", it refer8 to the ultimate physical,
,

subsistent end of the univ0:r'se, that 'which is p01jularly
called God.
How any thoughtful person who knows sf'.ything about
what the concept of God must ccntain, could say that

I
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He is a product of evolution is incon::;rehel'sible.
evolve mea ·s to unroll.

T~'

How ';-ou. can't fl[',ve unrollinp mere20
'
fu"1d tb.is someu

thing must have a cause which itself is ',-ot caused.

Other-

wise matter would hf:'.ve to be the ca~se of its own e:dste~1ce.
It vJOuld have to exist before it existed 1Nhich is abs·urd.

.

The conclus ion is the same 'lOt onl v for m8. tter, but for

.'

a~:1ythiYle:

fini te.

Therefore, the Uncaused Cause [,lust be

a being that is infinitely perfect.

:}ut vlhat is infin-

i tely perfec t cannot chal'f,;e, for in the c o11cept of change
is included the .':;.otion of acquiring or lOSinG some perfection.

~)ut

in a being wl::.ich is infinitely perfect

there can be neither liability of loss nor possibility
of gain.

rrherefore, the notion that God is beirJg

brought forth in the IGoors of a world-process is chiruerical.
Evolution, therefore, far from weakening tlle evidence for teleolon;y, aug!:1ents and corroborates it.

1'.. n

effic:lent cc:!'se rather gains than loses prestige by working
through

secondar~T

agents.

Our concept of God is nobler

if we suppose trtU t He created the world wi th laws and
powers for development than if we imar.sine that lIe had
constantly to intervene in order to create a new variety
or species or to extinp'uish an oln one.

I
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porro defectionum istar1..l..'l!l, cum efficientes
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est, neque illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi
per aures, non sane in specie, sed in speciei priva tione.
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2 vols.; Lipsiae: In ~re~c1i'5US'-E:~'G~ Teubneri, 1877), XII, 7.

13.

14.
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19.
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Thomas Harper,

OPe

c~.!.,
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Wbe.tever becomes anew msut taie its origin from
some cause of its becomi'l.g, since nothing evolves
itself from pote2tiality to act, or from non-being
to being.
St. T!lO:mHS, ,Ope ,c::!.~., Bk. I, ch. 13 (fin~.
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ClIA.PTj~R

VI

Some of thB recent Introductions to Philosophy
devote a section to v:hat they call. 'Ji;}!e u;:tew teleolo[,;y.n

as Lloyd I,iorp:an are

a;~onC

those wbo defend this

Their tbeory uJ)holds an irmnanent

•

V"j,9W •

akin to that

teleolog~'T

of Ber[!;son \'l'lOSG theory has already bee,n nentioned.
cording to this theory

~~o

Ac-

rr1ind is reql15_reri, to cO,lcei ve the

principle s of na tlJ.re' s order.

?rom the viewpoint of

being the worlrt is an orGanism

i~ ~b~ch

the

)arts are

ordered to th0 whole an,d the whole to the parts.
activity is a 1dnd of creati'lG evoh'tion,
self-realization and achievement.

8.

Its

process of

This realization pre-

sumably ',"loulcl consist in tllife, individuality, mind,
consci0 1.lsness, social or:~anization, freedom, morality,"
but whether

Yla ture

1

'vi 11 ever corrie to tbe end of its ten-

def'.cy crea ti ire evolution generally does L,ot say.

This

wi th i t3 postula te of an, inlma_ent, all-absor 1JL':,e; mind, ,

consti tutin(j no. tlJ.re, 'Norkinf£ in it a,nd ordering it t-:Jrour;h
evolutionar~

laws.

Both'are pantheistic.

Superior, we believe, to either of these theories

I

81
is a "pull" rather than
goad.

g.

But scholastics add that God is the author

of b oth

tr~

ends and the tendencies.

is intermediate; He is the fj.rs t
end.

Say \vhat you will

beginnin[:~

D.nd the lflst

Herein the scholastic doctrine is more complete and

ultimate.
ate

.'

"push", an attraction, not a

Of wb:ct vaJue is a tendency towards an h'rrnec1i-

:::00.1 or end?

when attained?

Of ':/b8. t val ue is

~n

inmlediate zoal even

Even if we supuosed tl'0 mat erial l.miverse

to be homocentric, and tbat all the ends of all the beings
ir~

the war ld were fulfilled in lJecoming for man an

object ei the I' of use or delight or contemplation; of what
val ue would it all be if 111an also did not have a goal,
an eternal, infinitely ss.tisfying object of all his desires
and loves, and through m8.n all things else?
tic systen this ob ject is given.

In the schoJas-

It is God.

All thinD'S
(

..)

were created by Him becavse of Fis desire to communicate
His goodness to others.

All thincs tend tow'ards Him,

man illL>:lediately, aDd through ::'0.9.n the lesser creatllres ..
Not by absorption in God, however, bl1t by love and contemplation of Him 1::an will find his happiness.

When man has

attained bis Coal the material vfOI'ld shall have served
its purpose and will be needed no longer.

~3ut

while

it exists we can still sey Uthe heayens show forth the
glory of God.
older

It

teleolor~y

This in brief is the complenent which the
offers to the new.

I
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1.
Geore;e Thomas White Patrick, Introduction to
Philosophy (New York: Houghton MifflIn Company, 1~4),
p. 163.

.
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